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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
BECOMING OTHER: VIRTUAL REALITIES IN CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE 
FICTION 
By 
Jamie Nicole Franks 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Bruce A. Harvey, Major Professor 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore the boundary between human and other 
created by virtual realities in contemporary science fiction novels. After a close reading 
of the three novels: Surface Detail, Existence, and Lady of Mazes, and the application of 
contemporary literary theories, the boundary presented itself and led to the discovery of 
where the human becomes other. The human becomes other when it becomes lost to the 
virtual reality and no longer exists or interacts with material reality. Each of the primary 
texts exhibits both virtual reality and humanity in different ways, and each is explored to 
find where humanity falls apart. Overall, when these theories are applied to real life there 
is no real way to avoid the potential for fully immersive virtual realities, but there are 
ways to avoid their alienating effects. 
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I. Introduction: The Human Alien 
 
Aliens are as necessary to science fiction as oxygen is to human beings. Without 
the promise (or threat) that we are not alone in the universe, the genre would not be as 
prevalent as it is today. Often, aliens act as vehicles representing the angels and demons 
of human nature, or to bring our worst fears as a species to life. They are easy monsters 
or gods, allowing us to blame outside forces for our own shortcomings, and ultimately to 
teach lessons about what we must change in ourselves to make the world better. Alien 
stories are today’s cautionary fairy tales. 
The word “alien” has its roots in ancient words that mean “to make strange or 
foreign.” To be alien is to be foreign, strange, estranged, isolated and inhuman. To 
alienate is to cause someone or something to be the alien and all that the word implies. 
Science fiction does have a lot to say on the subject of beings from the outer reaches of 
space, but there is a different sort of alien story that never reaches beyond the 
atmosphere. These are the stories in which technology, especially virtual reality, plays a 
major role. 
Virtual Reality is not a new idea. Most people living in developed nations have 
experience with cyberspace. Virtual worlds offer a kind of anonymity that is almost 
nonexistent in other media. As the popular meme goes: “On the internet, no one knows 
you’re a dog.” No one knows anything about you that you do not explicitly tell them. 
You can be anyone, or multiple anyones in as many different places as your computer’s 
processor will allow. There is something powerfully dangerous about the kind of power 
anonymity offers, and something equally dehumanizing about it. It is no wonder that 
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science fiction has latched on to such an incredible and terrifying invention of the human 
mind to create this new type of alien story. 
Science fiction takes cyberspace beyond the contemporary screen and (optional) 
keyboard. Most cyber-thrillers or even vague mentions of virtual worlds offer a much 
more immersive and interactive experience. With the right equipment, denizens of these 
futuristic landscapes can physically and mentally experience any environment they can 
dream up. Often, the ability to experience whatever the human imagination can dream up 
leads to the kinds of dire consequences seen in the works of William Gibson or other 
providers of cyberpunk fiction. The mass alienation of the human species is, more often 
than not, among these consequences. While cyberspace and VR theoretically make 
communication across vast distances much easier, thus bringing people closer together, 
the truth is that VR seems to cause people to become more closed off from each other in 
favor of the worlds they’ve created for themselves from a computer chair.  
The original idea behind such advanced technology is to create a society of freer, 
more fulfilled citizens who are the maters of their own fates and identities. In her book 
Representations of the Post/Human, Elaine Graham states: 
It is argued that contemporary digital technologies, such as virtual reality, are 
merely a continuation of human capacity for tool-making. What may seem 
unfamiliar and threatening is but an extension of perennial skills, serving not to 
undermine or expunge the human, but to enhance it, as tools have always done 
(185). 
In order to create a society of citizens who are the masters of fate and identity, humans 
must create the tools that allow them to do it on a massive scale.  Since the beginning of 
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time we have created tools to enhance our experiences and make our lives easier. The 
principle of creating virtual realities should not be viewed any differently than the 
creation of the wheel: we are enabled by both to travel vast distances in far less time than 
it would take to walk. The world becomes a smaller place. Physical, linguistic and mental 
barriers can be more easily crossed or completely broken down with each new thing that 
is created and introduced into the human experience. What we must remember, though, is 
that when someone is hurt using a tool, it is never the tool’s fault, but the wielder’s. 
It is easy to blame a gun for killing an innocent or a bomb for leveling a city. 
Behind those guns are bombs, though, there is a human being pulling the trigger or 
pressing the launch button. Likewise, video games and the oversaturation of images and 
things on the Internet are often blamed for school shootings or excessive violence. In 
reality, however, the only people who should be blamed for our faults and shortcomings 
as a species are ourselves. VR doesn’t isolate and alienate people; people isolate and 
alienate people. 
Karl Schroeder’s Lady of Mazes, David Brin’s Existence and Iain M. Banks’ 
Surface Detail all prominently feature Virtual Reality. Each narrative presents it 
differently. The concept of VR stays the same, whether it is fully immersive or just an 
overlay, it is always a digital, computer generated space where almost anything is 
possible. Speculatively, Graham says, virtual reality serves the “desire to ‘become (like) 
gods’ by striving towards semi-divine status and knowledge” (Graham, 170). In every 
single cautionary tale told through time, the mortal who tries to become like a god always 
fails. Hubris gets in the way of accomplishment and characters make foolish mistakes. 
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True, lessons are learned at the ends of these tales, but always at the expense of the boy 
who flew too close to the sun.  
Each of the three narratives features a different dehumanizing aspect to the way 
their virtual realities are used and/or how they are accessed. Lady of Mazes and Surface 
Detail both require implants connected directly to the nervous system for access to their 
respective virtualities, automatically creating cyborgs, something that is both more than 
and less than human. Virtual Reality is always accessible in Lady of Mazes, but in 
Surface Detail the only looks the reader gets into their virtual worlds are either after the 
use has chosen to “die” or if the user is engaged in the ongoing war between those who 
advocate for the existence of virtual hells and those who do not. The VR in Existence is 
not as fully immersive as those of the others, but access to it seems entirely dependent on 
wealth and location, creating a deep rift between those who “have” who are alienated via 
their own virtual overlays and those who “have not” who are alienated via their lack of 
connection with the rest of the world. The world itself, though represented as heaven, or a 
personal immersive haven, or a simple overlay that paints flowers on everything you 
walk by offers is only limited by the user, but when the user is limited by the mores of his 
society and further, his species, the fearful prospects of alienation and oppression are 
disturbingly plausible and often even come to pass in these narratives. In short: Humanity 
has no one to blame for its ultimate mass alienation but itself. 
  
5 
 
II. Chapter One: Singular Consciousness 
There has not been much criticism done on the texts of Karl Schroeder. His body 
of work deals in the far future and often touches on deep, philosophical themes. It is 
Space Opera in the vein of Iain M. Banks as evolved from the cyberpunk of William 
Gibson: absurd technological proportion paired with sprawling dystopia. Without a 
doubt, the technologies in Schroeder’s novels are just as incredible as any other text that 
falls in the Space Opera genre. However, the way in which he implements these 
technologies in his narrative is unique, if not downright bizarre. 
Schroeder’s 2005 Lady of Mazes, a prequel to his first novel, Ventus is set in the 
far future between a man-made free floating coronal in the Lethe Nebula and another 
larger habitat located somewhere near Jupiter. Man has colonized the galaxy and has 
reached the point of post-scarcity. Virtual Reality, hedonism, and general anarchy (for 
lack of a better term) take on a much darker tone than they do in the Culture series. 
Certainly, lawless society never hurts anybody in the free-for-all, hedonistic future.  
The novel follows Livia, a native of the Teven Coronal in the Lethe Nebula. 
When the coronal is violently attacked by an enemy no one seems to know anything 
about, she and her companions leave the nebula to seek help from the Archipelago—the 
ruling body of the Local System. Because the Lethe Nebula has grown outside of the 
Archipelago’s jurisdiction, no one there can do anything to help. Ultimately, the 
antagonists win and are ultimately defeated in Ventus: a novel where technology, 
specifically AI, goes horribly wrong. The novel and its sequel tell a tale of humans trying 
to live human-sized lives in a future that has long outgrown them. Humanity, of course, 
wins in the end, but not without paying a significant price. 
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Lady of Mazes is, perhaps, more serious minded than the Culture, but perhaps not 
so serious minded as Existence. The novel does use virtual reality in relation to the loss of 
the sense of the human self. Traditionally, humans only have the one consciousness 
unless they have been diagnosed with a serious mental disorder. Lady of Mazes explores 
the idea of casting a single consciousness out via virtual reality. The personality retains 
its singularity, but in multiple forms in various situations. The novel also explores the 
role of AI with regard to human consciousness and humanity in general. The technology 
has shifted so that the human psyche can be replicated to a potential infinity, ultimately 
rendering humanity as helpless as a stone on the beach: doomed to be moved, eroded, and 
eradicated on the whims and tides of artificiality. 
Human Enough 
Conveniently, Lady of Mazes, gives us the definition of a baseline human in its 
protagonist, Livia Kodaly. She is subjected to what is called a “cliff test” and passes it, 
proving her ultimate actual personhood. During a cliff test, the human in question is 
subjected to a virtual reality where they are suddenly falling off of the ledge of a very 
high cliff. The point is “to see whether you still have normal human responses to threat 
situations. Most Archipelagics who suddenly found themselves hanging from a cliff 
would assume it was just another inscape experience, and would not struggle. They 
would have had no adrenalin reaction,” because “they don’t have the experience of a 
stable and dangerous reality to ground them” (Schroeder, 151). Basically, the people of 
the Archipelago, a man-made, free-floating structure somewhere near Jupiter, have 
become so inundated in the safety of their virtual worlds that they no longer accept that 
their surroundings could possibly hurt them or affect them in any negative way. They 
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exist in a safe bubble of humanity where virtual reality, or inscape in this narrative, 
provides for them via neural implants where, as Elaine Graham puts it, “truth and reality 
are indistinguishable from illusion or simulation” (Graham, 191). Archipelagics have no 
fear of falling off of a cliff because the implant ensures that they not only avoid potential 
cliffs, but also something as mundane as running into another person. As we learn in an 
overheard conversation, “more than nine tenths of all our thought and action is 
unconscious… why should such petty issues as avoiding tripping over somebody be 
allowed to take up the last fraction” (Schroeder, 133)? The people living in this world 
have no concept of material reality. In a crowded shopping mall, people must see each 
other and move out of the way. When that is taken away, and an implant allows you to 
ignore the existence of all of those other people, there is not really that much left but the 
virtual world painted onto our consciousness. 
‘Other,’ in this setting is a creature, human by its biology alone, which no longer 
displays its fight or flight response. It has become complacent. There is no actual conflict 
or danger in its life. Virtual reality seeks to make its life seem meaningful and succeeds, 
at the expense of actual human perseverance and integrity. These beings which do not 
pass the cliff test are no longer human, they simply exist. If they want to fall off a cliff or 
experience being poisoned or attacked by a polar bear, they can, but they all know it is 
always just a simulation that can be turned off once they get too scared or bored with it to 
continue on. Humans, in this narrative, have become prosthetic: plastic representations of 
what used to be living parts. Margrit Shildrick claims, “The human body can be 
manipulated, extended or substituted seemingly without limits” (271).  The body, as 
malleable as it is, can be manipulated before and after it becomes vacant of all thought, 
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but not so much that biological death occurs. Since “uncovering the inherent plasticity of 
the body and its multiple possibilities of transcorporeality,” is incorporated into the 
culture of constant virtual reality via combining the “organic [the body itself] and 
inorganic non-self matter [neuro-implants], such modes of corporeal transformation can 
comprehensively undo the conventional limits of the embodied self” (Shildrick, 270, 
brackets mine). Clearly, with something like the cliff test acting as a common standard by 
which humanity is judged, the conventional limits of the embodied self are no longer 
relevant.  
There are those on the Archipelago who abandon the comforts of constant virtual 
reality for what is colloquially called “crippleview,” where “cripple” is defined as not 
using your neural implants to influence the world around you to whatever you think it 
should be. While waiting for his companions to come to their senses and remember their 
mission (asking for help from the Archipelagics), Qiingi, one of the main protagonists, 
meets a pair of girls, one of whom shares her story with him. In her narrative, the true 
nature of the comfortable lie of virtual reality is revealed. Ishani begins her story by 
telling us that six generations of her family all lived together on an estate in a coronal. 
This is not remarkable by itself; after all, trillions of people live on coronals, free-floating 
rings in space made by people for people. She tells the story of how her friend Charon, 
aptly named for the rower on the River Styx, begins to guide her towards the death of her 
worldview: 
He came to see me in my studio one day—I was a pretentious little girl 
and fancied myself a painter. I’d had a real studio built for me by the 
house bots, high up in one attic of the main building. I wore and old-style 
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Parisian painter’s cap and a white smock while I worked, even though I 
would never in a million years have touched real paint. I was working in 
airblocks when Charon came in, moving sculpted shapes of opacity and 
colored translucence around to create a light sculpture… Charon took one 
look at me, and burst out laughing (177) 
On its own, this is just an innocuous young woman in the awkward teenage stage of 
trying on different faces to find herself. In the less extreme cases of contemporary media, 
there are hundreds of teenage girls just like this, resisting social reality to try to find their 
own ways through life. The story continues, however, when Charon says to Ishani, 
“You’re not much more real than that stuff you’re playing with, are you?” Ishani plays it 
off, but Charon continues, ultimately opening a virtual window: 
Visions unfolded in that window like flowers opening in the sun—
first dozens, then as Charon’s query raced through the worlds of the 
Archipelago, hundreds, thousands of subwindows floated in an infinite 
space next to my sculpture. They rotated in and out of focus at the front of 
the field. And, in each of them, a young woman stood in front of a half-
finished light sculpture. 
 “This is what’s happening right this second, all across the 
Archipelago,” said Charon, “I simply asked inscape dot show me all the 
publically accessible feeds from girls who are working with airblocks.”  
After all, in a universe of trillions it is entirely reasonable that any number of teenage 
girls are trying to create art in various environments: 
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 “It gets better,” said Charon, “Let’s do a query on how many of 
those sculptures are just like yours.” 
“Stop,” I said, but he went ahead with it, opening a second 
window—and there they were, dozens of girls making my sculpture. 
“And even better,” he continued, enjoying the look of horror that 
must have stolen across my face, then, “let’s see how many of those girls 
are being mocked by a friend who’s doing queries next to their work—“  
The odds do not favor us finding two teenaged girls drawing the exact same picture in the 
same exact environment at the same exact time in the contemporary world. Once human 
numbers begin to reach into the trillions, finding two such girls becomes slightly more 
possible. Charon does us the service of clarifying: 
You’re a wallpaper, Ishani. You can’t have a thought that a million other 
people aren’t having, you can’t do anything that a million other people 
aren’t also doing. It doesn’t matter what you say or whether you live or die 
because a million other you’s are there to take your place (177-8). 
The reveal of her status as wallpaper is not what ultimately disturbs Ishani to the point of 
moving her life to crippleview, however. She got over it, “Several months later, the 
whole incident had receded and become trivial,” she says. She encounters Charon once 
again, who is not surprised that she does not care or does not remember the shock and 
horror she felt, “Your narrative steered you away from the edge of that cliff,” he explains, 
“That’s what it does… the great commandment of the narratives is that your life must be 
meaningful… if knowing the truth strips the meaning away, then the truth must be 
suppressed” (179). Technology has found a way to see to it that every life feels as though 
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it has purpose and meaning. However, when everything has meaning in the same exact 
way, meaning ceases to exist. Actions become robotic, people and those who identify as 
people just begin going through the motions, whether consciously or because a high and 
mighty AI brain has predetermined the meaning in their lives. Citizens of the Archipelago 
are allowed to follow their dreams in an absurd final realization that everyone is a special 
snowflake meant for great things. Ultimately, this system renders the reward from 
working for your goals completely meaningless. There is never the chance of failure and 
growth from failure, creating stagnation and priming the human species to fade into 
nothing. Almost no one in this universe even realizes that they are, as Charon so 
eloquently put it, just wallpaper: looked at, discarded and very easily replaced. They are 
all leading such meaningful lives that they are now completely meaningless and obsolete. 
Meaningful lives become like fashion accessories, they are exciting when they are new 
and different, but become commonplace, boring, and largely meaningless once everyone 
begins using them. 
In the process of advancement, humanity is lost and people just become moving 
parts in a machine that no longer has any purpose. There is no longer anything to work 
for, there is no longer any such thing as conflict or progress. Emotion must be earned 
through torture and even then only let out during key events of a person’s life. If lives 
even have individual key events anymore. Everyone is given a purpose that they have not 
earned, every life has meaning that is not worked for. When nothing is earned, nothing is 
gained and nothing changes. 
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Feelings and Multiplicity 
After a catastrophic event on one of the Archipelago’s coronals, Livia is brought 
to be the baseline human to soothe the survivors by her mere presence. When she is 
uncertain of what exactly her role is, the Government, an AI, assures her that she is 
already performing her role. “They see something they may never have seen before,” the 
Government explains, “a normal human reacting normally to a traumatic situation” 
(Schroeder, 159). Humans, or perhaps post-humans who were seeking something more 
on their small man-made world, are so out of touch with reality that their instincts are 
simply gone. All the affected humans need to do is see Livia having normal human 
responses to a traumatic situation and they can begin to regain their hold on material 
reality. It reminds them that no, everything in the universe is not supposed to feel or be 
“good” for whatever value of the word you hold. It reminds them that “good” only has 
meaning if there is “bad” or “stressful” or “traumatic” to compare it to. A grand 
statement, to be sure, but it seems that some kind of balance must be maintained in order 
for humans to be human. 
Here and in The Culture, VR is a realm of unmitigated pleasure. People like to do 
things that make them feel good. In a post-scarcity society, chances are that the hierarchy 
has “disappeared” and melted into something resembling egalitarianism. That is, 
everyone has access to the endless playground that is virtual space. Automatic access to 
the id’s desire is not only lazy, but immeasurably dangerous. Every virtual narrative 
comes to the inevitable point where unrestrained pleasure has become boring and the 
violent aspects of human nature (for lack of a better term) have begun to take hold. 
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Virtual pleasure becomes the virtual need to cause pain, or to be in pain, or to wage war 
or commit violent crimes. 
Even though violence is an unavoidable part of any VR narrative, it is always 
frowned upon and it is always “hidden.” Violence is relegated to the deep corners of 
cyberspace and locked under pass codes and firewalls that stop exactly no one who is 
willing enough from gaining access. In corporeal space, pain is a given part of existing. It 
serves as a sign that we are alive and offers something to make us grateful that things 
such as “pleasure” or “joy” exist. Once there is an option for a body to no longer feel 
pain, it would choose not to feel pain as long as it did not mean death. Yet, VR narratives 
always include virtual dens of iniquity where some violence is done to a questionably 
willing victim. Lady of Mazes, is no exception. 
Still, there seems to be a need for actual emotional authenticity in the 
Archipelago. Take Sophia Eckhardt, for instance. Upon the first mention of her we learn 
that she has “tattoos, apparently physical” (Schroeder, 130) which is unusual enough in 
this setting. Learning why she has actual, physical tattoos is what drives the way of life in 
the Archipelago home. Sophia is a musician, or soundtrack on the Archipelago, but not 
just any soundtrack: 
The tattoos were apparently proudly-born marks of an ordeal Sophia had 
undergone years ago. In a carefully constructed virtual world… she had 
allowed herself to be starved, tortured, and terrorized for weeks. She had 
emerged with anxiety and rage, her days full of bad memories and flinch-
reactions. With the use of drug and neuroimplant therapies she could 
easily partition off that side of herself and live a placid life. But when she 
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performed at assigned times in other people’s narratives she let it all out, 
and her rawness and pain lent emotional power to whatever key event was 
occurring in the person’s life (135). 
In other words, what is termed in contemporary jargon as “life experience” must be 
crammed into a few torture-ridden weeks just so a songstress can put some real, raw 
emotion into her music. This implies that actually feeling something, or having things 
that evoke strong emotion or at least possess strong emotional value still have a place in a 
post-scarcity, post-hardship society. What is disturbing is that hardship has to be 
simulated. The reader is not privy to many of the details of Sophia’s time in whatever 
virtual hell she was subjected to, all we know is that she had to be subjected to some sort 
of hell in order to be able to feel again. Even more disturbing is the fact that she is called 
a “soundtrack,” a term that applies to ambient background noise in visual media. Sophia 
has willingly put herself through hell to be relegated to the background noise of other 
people’s lives. 
It is not all doom and listless drones, however. Teven, Livia the baseline’s home, 
is separated into what are called manifolds, the Lady of Mazes term for societies or 
cultures. While manifolds act somewhat like countries insofar in that they all occupy a 
different space on the coronal, they are also dictated by the virtual world. All citizens of 
Teven have neural implants which enable a technology called inscape. Inscape provides 
the virtual reality overlay in the physical space of a manifold. The technology and visuals 
that are available to any citizen are directly dictated by tech-locks, which communicate 
with the implants and enforce a manifold’s way of life as soon as the borders, called 
horizons, between them are crossed. The culture that we spend the most time with on 
15 
 
Teven in is the highly technological, Neo-Victorian Westerhaven and the tribal forest 
where Raven’s People dwell. In Westerhaven, society relies on the use of avatars, called 
animas. Animas are physical manifestations of multiple identities, hauntingly reflective 
of Graham’s argument that “the unitary face-to-face self is superseded by the multiple 
self” (Graham, 5). While the virtual world allows us to pretend to have multiple 
personalities across digital media, the animas in Westerhaven all share one personality 
with their hosts.  
Any individual can have any number of animas doing any number of things on 
their behalf. They are manifestations of the personalities of those they represent and are 
able to make decisions in the stead of their physical counterparts. People in Westerhaven 
know when they are talking to an anima, but it does not seem rude or even unusual to 
leave an anima or enter one mid-conversation. Contemporary virtual communication is 
largely still faceless. However, programs like Skype and FaceTime are becoming 
increasingly more popular. So it comes as no surprise that VR stories, Lady of Mazes in 
particular, have cycled back into a form of embodied communication. Graham notes, 
“forms of virtual interaction retain many of the conventions of face-to-face community” 
(Graham, 189). Societies in this narrative have taken virtual interaction to the extreme in 
their execution of virtual communications. There is a need in human communication to 
be able to “read” what the other person or persons are feeling based on their facial 
expressions and their tone of voice. These things are difficult to communicate over text, it 
is only natural that an alternative might be found and explored within the realm of 
science fiction, and especially within the realm of immersive virtual reality. 
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Between Primitive and Obsolescence 
Most important about the way Teven operates is the compromise it enforces 
between physical reality and virtual reality. While places like Westerhaven rely heavily 
on technology to forward their diplomatic goals or to hide their emotions from their 
peers, physical presence is still important. In the beginning of the novel, the protagonist 
Livia Kodaly must go through the conversations her animas engaged in to learn what she 
might have agreed to the night before. She learns that she fought a duel on behalf of a 
man she hadn’t realized she was attracted to and lost. While musing on what she would 
have done if she’d actually been there in person, she comes to the conclusion, “If her 
anima had fought a duel, then Livia herself almost certainly would have done so had she 
been there in its place. Animas might only be imitations of people, but they were very 
accurate imitations” (Schroeder, 11). It is taken completely for granted that any decision 
an anima makes is automatically the one that the physical person would have made. 
There is no questioning that an AI might be flawed, or that it might develop its own 
personality traits. Livia has a brief moment of questioning it, and immediately brushes it 
off. The technology that replicates her personality canot possibly be incorrect. She would 
have fought the duel whether it was her physical presence there or not, no matter what the 
consequences are to diplomatic pull and credibility. 
Personalities can be so easily imitated that even the original is convinced that the 
replications make correct decisions in their stead. It is taken for granted and clearly not 
even worth a thought. The easy copy and pasting of personalities is troubling. After all, 
what use is there for the original consciousness if it can so easily be imitated? It is true 
that animas are made via the neural implants. However, there are also agents. These are 
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independent personalities that the neural implants paint on the user’s senses. In Livia’s 
case, they appear as fairies named Peaseblossom and Cicada. These agents are AIs which 
can, and often do, summarize the exploits of Livia’s animas from the day before. Livia 
can then relive the conversations or events on her own, or she can request that they do it 
for her and they will give her the highlights of her evening. It is remarked that they are 
painted onto her senses. Later, however, the agents find a way to acquire actual bodies of 
their own to occupy corporeal space. The novel implies that the same level of technology 
is available on Teven. It could be, then, that rampant AIs could take over, somehow, and 
no one would even know what was happening.  
It is strange when we consider how the very existence of animals might change 
the nature of a thing as commonplace as conversation. A person does not have to be 
physically present in body or mind to speak with another person. Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
statement, “where we are, amounts to nothing more, perhaps, than a reflection, or floating 
shadows” (Nancy, 4) is given an entirely new meaning in a science fiction context. 
Already, in Nancy’s words, we are ghosts of ourselves even as we allegedly exist in a 
corporeal reality. Even so, we cast ourselves out into the virtual world and become words 
on a screen, a reflection of a ghost. Lady of Mazes pushes it into the future, casting the 
human soul back into a physical form in a thousand different directions in a thousand 
manifestations—a shadow of a reflection of a ghost; one that is allowed to make 
conscious  choices when the original consciousness doesn’t even know where the body 
stops and thought begins. 
The concept of animas seems like a natural evolution given that the very idea of 
phone conversations is that one person does not have to be there bodily in order to talk to 
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another person. After all, “we’re obsessed with showing a this” (Nancy, 3), and we 
cannot show a this with the present invisibility that distant communication currently 
entails. The need to see and interact is shown even now with video-chat mediums such as 
Skype or Face Time. The difference between current video-chat technology and the 
scattering of shadow-copies of one’s self is that it is incredibly difficult to pretend to be a 
different person when your partner in conversation can see and read your face. In a text-
based internet chat room, anyone can take on any identity, anyone can be scattered in 
thirty different chat rooms and attempt to be thirty different people. The concept of 
animas is more of a direct evolution of the idea of the computer chat room, save that the 
animas can only act upon the decisions that the core mind would probably make in any 
given situation. Like Livia, one person can hold thirty different conversations about thirty 
different topics at once. The difference is the bodily presence, there is always a body 
called Livia, which usually looks like Livia, to look at and talk to and even touch or duel 
with. Livia’s original brain can only be with her original physical body. However, each 
anima has a simulation of Livia’s original brain, or at least a good enough imitation that 
Livia takes it for granted that her animas make absolutely correct choices in place of her 
original self.  
Livia does not always have to look like Livia, either. Besides the manifolds 
imposing technology limitations on a society, they also sometimes impose different 
appearances. In a manifold called Blockworld, for instance, everyone appears as a 
cartoonish caricature or animal rather than a human being. On a smaller scale, in 
manifolds where animas are allowed, animas can appear any way the original wants 
them: including wearing different clothes, having different eyes or hair, uglier or more 
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beautiful or even as the opposite gender. If you had never met any Livia before, and a 
male anima version of her approached you for conversation, the only thing you would 
really know for sure is that you were talking to an anima. There is nothing to suggest that 
Livia’s original form jumping into the anima would do anything to disrupt whatever 
illusion the anima is presenting. There is clearly an acceptable level of dishonesty among 
Westerhaveners on top of the blind trust that the AI will not become self-aware and 
terminate humanity. Or, at the very least, begin playing uncharacteristic pranks on each 
other. They are, after all, “very accurate imitations.” 
Control over presenting oneself gets even more specific and probably even more 
political. During any given interaction, Livia and others of Westerhaven can have masks, 
which can show a pleasant smile or an emotionless façade if the person behind wishes to 
hide the emotions on their faces. Diplomacy is incredibly important to the culture of 
Westerhaven, it can be useful to hide surprise or amusement if showing it will cause a 
diplomatic incident. However, venturing outside of Westerhaven, we find that there are 
societies that value the purity of true emotion and do not allow masks or animas. You 
must always only be an original and however you emote, no matter the diplomatic 
consequences, is what you are stuck with. Conversation in general is difficult when one 
person canot gauge how the other is feeling based on their facial or body expressions. 
Imagining conversation with what is essentially an AI imitation of a supposed real person 
which is also able to hide its emotions behind a mask is frightening. While people in 
Westerhaven will always seem to know the difference between an anima and the real 
thing, it does not seem to matter in the face of sincerity. In fact, in places like 
Westerhaven, sincerity seems to be a thing of the distant past. 
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Westerhaven seems excessive with respect to the more low-key and less 
politically inclined societies It should be remembered that no one is bound to the 
manifold in which they are born. If one does not like the two-faced diplomatic ways of 
Westerhaven, they can move after their horizons are literally expanded at adolescence. 
When a resident of Teven comes of age, the horizons that keep the manifolds separated 
are dropped, allowing unimpeded exploration of the surrounding world in order to find 
where you feel you belong and where you can lead a meaningful existence. All of this 
technology is available: the ability to create digital copies of a person, the ability to 
protect from pain or death or disease, the capability of curing all birth defects in the 
womb. Yet humans still feel they need to lead meaningful, human-scale lives. Not only 
that, but it is much easier to find a place to lead such a life when infinite possible 
societies exist that will allow you to keep to your values. Meaning can be found in how 
closely we, as individuals, hold to the values we create for ourselves. Rather than being 
forced to keep to those values in the face of adversity, the environment provided on the 
Teven Coronal makes it easy: no adversity, you live in your mostly perfect society with 
people who mostly agree with you.  
This is not to say that there are not any disagreements. War exists for the people 
of Teven, though the one we are privy to between Westerhaven and Raven’s People is 
“Only in the gamers’ submanifold. It’s purely voluntary” (Schroeder, 21). So within the 
manifolds, there are further divided manifolds that no one has to take part in. If someone 
from Raven or Westerhaven wants a good war to relieve their stress, all they have to do is 
log in to this submanifold and they get the experience of war without all of the death and 
property damage. It is never really revealed what the war is about, aside from a vague 
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statement that, “there have always been lands that are not strongly real for either of our 
peoples” (Schroder, 54). So there seems to be some trouble with deciding how far the 
manifolds spread in the physical world, at least in some places. The war, though, only 
seems to be important for a few people. Some on both sides feel that physical space is 
worth fighting over, but if others want nothing to do with it, they do not even have to see 
it or pay any attention to it. Ultimately, when there is utterly no need for any sort of 
conflict to occur, people must create their own conflicts in order to make their choices 
more meaningful. At the same time, any conflict, such as a war or a diplomatic incident 
that someone does not want to experience can be ignored so thoroughly that it might as 
well not even exist. 
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III. Chapter Two: Between War and Hell 
The Culture series, written by the late Iain M. Banks, falls into the Space Opera 
genre. The series has all of the Space Opera tropes: melodrama, adventure on the 
grandest scale, and incredible technology that might as well be magic. The titular Culture 
is a post-scarcity and post-law society. Citizens live in indolent comfort and are allowed 
to, in general, do as they please. Stories about people who can do what they want with 
little to no consequences would not be interesting to read. Thus, Contact exists. Contact is 
the branch of Culture which deals with alien societies. The stories end up being about the 
adventures of the Contact agents and the aliens they are trying to integrate or defeat. 
Packed within the ridiculous and unlikely levels of technology and the equally 
ridiculous adventures of the protagonists, are interwoven commentaries about the human 
condition. Banks’ commentaries include basic human rights, the existence (or not) of the 
soul, and attempts to find what it means to exist as a sentient being in the universe. Each 
novel encompasses a different theme, mixing pulp-like adventure with the “serious” 
questions that more “serious” literature tries to answer (or even ask) in a more “serious” 
way. 
Chapter Two examines the questions extant within the penultimate of the ten 
Culture novels, Surface Detail. Briefly, Surface Detail covers a murder, revenge for said 
murder, a war in heaven, and virtual reality. Thematically, it deals with the soul, with 
ownership, with the increasing importance that the virtual world has with regard to the 
material one, and perhaps most importantly with the body. However, in spite of Surface 
Detail focusing largely on cyberspace and virtual reality, this installation in The Culture 
series still qualifies as space opera rather than cyberpunk. That is to say, while the other 
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novels I cover might portray a more pessimistic view of the way direction things are 
headed, The Culture, is always good for an uplifting tale about how glorious the post-
scarcity, anarchic, machine laden future will be. 
Souls, Heaven, and Hell 
Virtual Realities take a rather unique form in Surface Detail. In other Culture 
novels, it is suggested that VR is similar to any other science fiction setting: you log in 
and your imagination is the limit. One can do anything at any time they want and log out 
again whenever they feel like returning to the material world. It may seem an odd 
addition to a future-society such as the Culture where everything already is possible, and 
it is not suggested that there is much more to VR than what the Culture already has to 
offer. In spite of what the Culture wishes was true, other galactic civilizations do exist 
alongside it, and not all of them hold with the same principles or have the same 
technology level as the Culture does. Virtual Reality becomes a strangely metaphysical 
and religious experience especially in the highly technological societies. Virtual Reality 
is a realm that assuredly exists. It is both outside of and yet somehow still within 
subjective reality. Signals can be sent to your brain to make you feel as though you are 
interacting with a real world, but you are not. Nothing in the virtual universe is 
technically physically real. Surface Detail pushes the concept of Virtual Reality to its 
natural conclusion: the creation of virtual afterlives. 
In many of these societies, immortality is entirely possible. However, sentiences 
that are born mortal will eventually want to die, and for those that are not ready to face 
what lies beyond there are the virtual afterlives. When a person dies in the Culture, they 
can choose to either be inserted into a brand new body to continue on with their lives, 
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they can choose to keep on with dying, or they can choose to “die” and be sent to a 
virtual afterlife. In general, these reference the heavens, those that “offer everlasting fun 
for the post-dead,” or those that are “as much for the benefit of those still living as the 
dead themselves, providing societies that had inherited or recently come up with the idea 
of consulting the ancestors,” as well as the more contemplative heavens of a 
“philosophical nature” (Banks, 127-8). A person, once they have grown tired of living in 
a material plane of existence, may choose to “die” and stay “dead” until they grow bored 
or go insane or beg for true death. No society with access to the technology (save for the 
highly traditionalist ones) has any problems with letting its citizens “die” and, via the 
advent of soulkeeping technology, enjoy a virtual heaven for a while. 
The “soul” is a given in The Culture. Even if it has no real religious significance, 
the citizens of the galaxy all acknowledge that there is a part of sentience that goes 
beyond the physical. There are several definitions of “soul” that are relevant to the ideas 
presented in Surface Detail. One of the Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions includes, 
“a person’s emotions, feelings, or thoughts; the moral or emotional part of a person’s 
nature; the central or inmost part of a person’s being” (OED, 2012). Basically, “soul” is 
defined as anything about existing that cannot be physically touched—the things that are 
described as being “felt” (as emotions) or “thought.” In Surface Detail, souls are 
described in a safe, secular manner as “mind states” and “dynamic full-brain process 
inventories” (Banks, 66). All definitions seem to agree on something metaphysical. The 
term “consciousness” can be used interchangeably with “soul” in the context of the novel. 
Whichever definition is “correct,” the idea that it is the core of the person and that it 
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survives the physical body’s death. More importantly, souls are saved and stored as 
digital information to be conserved perfectly in digital reality. 
Preservation of a consciousness is done via “soul-saving technology” or 
“soulkeepers.” In the Culture, these devices are called neural laces. A lace begins as a 
planted seed in a physical brain and “grows with the brain it’s part of, it beds in over the 
years, gets very adept at mirroring every detail of the mind it interpenetrates and coexists 
with” (Banks 78) to create a (probably) perfect copy of the host. In the event of the host’s 
death or in the event of a traumatic brain injury that renders them dead enough for it to 
count, the consciousness can then be implanted into a brand new vat grown body that 
meets any specification the host desires. Thus, the body is rendered completely 
superficial. A host can theoretically change bodies as many times as it chooses to, or 
simply choose to exist, bodiless, in a virtual environment. The body in Surface Detail is 
thus othered from itself permanently, in that it is rendered completely irrelevant by 
societies possessing soulkeeper technology Corporeal presence does not carry the same 
weight that it used to in societies like the Culture. Rather, they favor of digitally uploaded 
minds, “participation in cyberspace is necessarily postcorporeal,” posits Elain Graham. 
An uploaded mind allows for a self as “the master of pure knowledge,” since the needs of 
the body become irrelevant. (Graham, 188). The instances of cyberspace we are privy to 
in Surface Detail are not concerned with achieving a pure mastery of knowledge. Rather, 
the impulse seems to be to continue acting on very human thoughts, imaginations, and 
desires. New knowledge does not seem to be sought. Instead, games are played, wars are 
fought, afterlives are joined, and bodies are switched. The ultimate freedom to literally do 
as you please within a virtual world is met with the limits of human imagination.  
26 
 
In a society such as the Culture, the very idea of a virtual reality would seem just 
as irrelevant as the idea of embodiment. There is not much that a virtual reality can offer 
in cyberspace that the Culture cannot offer in physical space. Ultimately, this leads to 
speculation on why a virtual heaven is needed at all aside from the burden of actually 
being alive. Bodily death or brain death, though rare, can still occur in these 
hypertechnological societies, and if the choice is made for that body or physical brain to 
stay dead, the person only continues to exist as code in a server room somewhere. In 
effect, they are no longer human. Certainly, they experience the human burdens of 
thought and memory, certainly they still feel and they can certainly still operate within a 
body: but none of that occurs in material reality. For all intents and purposes, this person 
no longer exists—and yet, in the same strange space and thought-occupancy that virtual 
reality inhabits, they do still exist.  
The Hells, on the other hand, “existed because some faiths insisted on them, and 
some societies too, even without the excuse of over-indulged religiosity” (Banks, 131). 
Sometimes the faith of a culture insists on an extant hell in order to keep its practitioners 
well behaved, it is similar for secular hells. Hells are punishment in a virtual world where 
all experiences and sensations might as well exist in material reality. It is heavily implied, 
if not outright stated, that no one chooses to go to hell. Hells, where they exist, are used 
as a scare-tactic. They act as incentive for citizens, hanging the threat of torment for 
thousands of subjective years over them to keep them from gross disobedience of the 
society’s often harsh laws. The only trouble is: 
…many species and civilisations objected profoundly to the very idea of 
Hells, no matter whose they were. A lot objected profoundly to the very 
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idea of torture in any event and the practice of setting up Virtual 
Environments—traditionally such dazzlingly fabulous realms of 
unmitigated pleasure—devoted to inflicting pain and suffering on sentient 
creatures seemed not just wrong but perverse, sadistic, genuinely evil and 
shamefully, disgracefully cruel (Banks, 132). 
Not only is it wrong that the hells exist in the first place, it is even more heinous that they 
exist within Virtual Space, a (non)place that should be dedicated to joy and pleasure and 
doing whatever a mind can dream up. Being forcibly shoved into a realm where sadistic 
demons stretch your nerves across miles of burning sand is not typically anyone’s idea of 
fun or carefree frolicking (forgive me if I am incorrect, I have no source to cite on this). 
Hells are “only rarely linked with other Afterlives, hellish or otherwise, and even then 
only under strict superveillance, and usually only with the aim of heightening the anguish 
of the sufferers by subjecting them to torments their own people somehow hadn’t thought 
of” (Banks, 132). Pleasure, as it were, is freely shared across the universe, torment and 
anguish seems to be a much more private matter. Not only has the soul in question been 
dehumanized through death, it has been further othered through careful and copious 
torture. 
Those confined to hell are not only the playthings of the demons uploaded there, 
but to those who decided to put them there. The demons are obvious, they are specifically 
chosen for their extreme sadism and copied and pasted throughout hell. The conservative 
senators, however, claim that the hells do not really exist. “We need the threat of 
punishment in the afterlife to keep us from behaving like mere beasts in this existence,” 
the senator claims (Banks, 275). He continues to claim that hell is only a threat. Those 
28 
 
who take tours of hell are only watching a movie in 4D. The fact that we know that hell 
actually exists creates increasingly disturbing implications. We are never told what the 
senator’s actual role is in hell. He may be one of the demons or he may get together with 
his friends to watch the torture over popcorn and whiskey. They know that the hells are 
fully functional. The sufferers are not people to those existing outside of the suffering. 
The victims are objects to be played with, tormented, and watched. 
The tortured are just as affected as those causing the torture and watching it 
happen. Chay becomes so distraught in her journey through hell that she forgot that she 
was on a mission to prove that it actually exists. “That is just a dream,” she claims, “just a 
dream. A treacherous dream. This is what is real” (Banks, 46). She has lost all sense of 
herself in the material world and has embraced herself as a string of code in a coded hell. 
The tortures are such that not only have outside forces completely dehumanized them, 
they have dehumanized themselves. 
Body Matters 
It is, perhaps, natural for a transcendental creation such as virtual reality to be 
applied to the transcendental creations that are afterlives. It seems natural that humans, 
who have always been curious about what lies after death, would try to simulate it once 
the technology is available. However, as Graham argues, “The absorption of corporeal 
presence into a purely digital embodiment may well suggest the effacement of the body, 
such that participation in cyberspace is necessarily postcorporeal” (188).  If this is the 
case, then it seems that Banks is doing it all wrong. True, the “real” body is in no way 
necessarily involved with virtual space; however, the reader is never more aware of the 
body in Surface Detail than when the setting is in a VR. Considering the nature of Virtual 
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Reality and the way it is used in this narrative in two separate dehumanizing aspects: 
post-death and war, this is not surprising. 
The novel begins with a murder. This is quite shocking because, as the blurb on 
the back of the book tells us, the murder victim is the main character of the novel. There 
is no need to worry. A few chapters after her death we learn that Lededje, the victim, was 
uploaded into a conveniently nearby Culture mind (a hyperadvanced ship AIs who might 
as well be human). She, of course, does not know this. She wakes in a strange place, and 
the only clue she is given about her whereabouts is the word SIMULATION in the 
bottom of her field of vision. To her mind “the place looked perfectly, entirely real” 
(Banks 59). Not only does the room look real, it feels real: “SIMULATION, the word still 
said. She slammed one fist into the side frame of the mirror, felt pretty much exactly the 
amount of pain she would have anticipated, and sucked warm, fragrant air through her 
teeth” (Banks 60). Because of the highly accurate physical sensations she has 
experienced, she is not entirely convinced that she is actually in a simulation. Ultimately, 
what convinces her, and what unsettles her the most, is that what she sees in the mirror is 
not her “real” body. “While she still felt entirely like herself within herself…she was 
inside a body which was perfectly, flawlessly unmarked…No intaglia, no tattoo, no 
markage whatsoever” (Banks 61). As one of the intagliated, Lededje is defined by her 
physical appearance. She was modified in the womb, marked with a full body tattoo that 
covers not only her skin, but her eyes, teeth and organs. The tattoos mark her as an 
indentured servant, her purpose is to stand around in revealing clothing and look pretty. 
In the eyes of her society, she is an object. 
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Almost the first thing Lededje realizes is that her body is not her own. The tattoo 
that marked her as an object is gone, leaving a lapse in her sense of self. Not only is this 
what convinces her that she is not home anymore, it acts as a cause of distress and 
anxiety. In his work “On the Soul,” Jean-Luc Nancy argues:  
The soul is the body’s difference from itself, the relation to the outside that the 
body is for itself. In other words... the soul is the difference from itself that makes 
the body…The soul is not specifically human, even if the human soul has its 
proper characteristics. Here it therefore has to do with the soul of every organized 
living body. The soul is the form of a body. (Nancy, 126) 
The soul, according to Nancy, is its own sort of body. Whether it is a human soul or not, 
it is a part of existing. He acknowledges that it is not a physical body. Rather, that the 
soul comprises what is not the body, and the body is the material aspect of being. 
It is already established that it is the soul or consciousness that gets transported 
into the virtual realm in Surface Detail. When Lededje looks into the mirror, she is seeing 
her soul made physical via code; the body of her soul. While she feels like herself within 
herself, the form she occupies at this point and her discomfort with it indicates that 
Lededje is not only intagliated and objectified physically, but she is in her mind as well. 
Similar to the victims of the Pavulean hell, she has cycled from being objectified by 
others into objectifying herself. 
Lededje has never been much exposed to the Culture and was not aware that she 
even had a neural lace in her brain. She never expected to be vented into virtual reality 
upon her death, and so it only seems natural that she would latch on to the one thing that 
made her her: her body. One case does not make for much of an argument, however, 
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Lededje’s is not the only case of hyperawareness over the body in a virtual realm. 
Throughout the novel, we are privy to the many sordid adventures of Vatueil, a high 
ranking officer in the war effort to disband the hells from the universe. We later find out 
that all of his exploits take place in VR and in each one he inhabits a different kind of 
body with no knowledge (usually) of his previous encounters: all of which are uploaded 
to his master consciousness in some remote location. 
Though we are never wholly certain about what each of his tasks accomplishes, 
we do know that his body is different each and every time. We also know that each time, 
just as Lededje is, he is extremely aware of said body. When he is first introduced he is 
“Conscript Vatueil, late of Their Highnesses’ First Cavalry, now reduced to Third 
Expeditionary Sappers,” and we immediately know that he “wiped his sweating brow 
with a grimy, calloused hand. He worked his knees forward a few centimetres across the 
stony floor of the tunnel, sending fresh darts of pain up his legs” (Banks, 17). It does not 
stop there: throughout the chapter we have plenty of examinations of Conscript Vatueil’s 
bodily complaints and conditions: “The exertion set off further stabs of pain, which ran 
up his back and across his straining shoulders,” and, “The collision jarred his hands, arms 
and shoulders, setting his teeth on edge and ringing his aching back as though it was a 
bell. He almost cried out, but instead just sucked in a breath of stale, warm, humid air, 
pungently scented with his own bodily odours,” and, “He’d felt ill since just after 
breakfast back and the surface and on the walk to the face. The last part especially, 
doubled over, had been a nightmarish slog of increasing nausea,” and, “He was tall and 
his back hit more of the roof support beams than the other men’s. He was developing 
what the long-serving sappers called back buttons; raised welts of hardened skin above 
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each bone in his spine like giant warts” (Banks, 17-8) appear on the first two pages of the 
chapter alone. While the focus is largely on the aches and pains a sapper might feel, we 
are privy to the fact that there are also smells, and the beginnings of an effect that seems 
to imply several weeks, perhaps months of similar work.  
Reading this chapter for the first time, we are not aware that any of this takes 
place within virtual space. Parallel to the chapter preceding it, Vatueil is tortured for 
information and then killed. We are left wondering if this is a book of vignettes about 
characters and their gruesome deaths until we meet Vatueil again, this time in an entirely 
new and different context. In a metanarrative, Vatueil has been uploaded into a robot 
which “had been built to fight,” we also learn “The thing he was in was a thing, an ‘it,’ 
but he was not an ‘it’; he was a he. He was a man… He was still who he was but he was 
also inside the thing, the machine that was designed and built to fight and perhaps get 
destroyed” (Banks, 115). Vatueil knows what he is now and knows who he was.  These 
chapters parallel Lededje’s uncomfortable journey outside of her own skin. Vatueil is 
more comfortable with the idea of body jumping, it is expected of him as a soldier. Still, 
the very fact that each of them notes that they feel like themselves within themselves but 
no longer inhabit the same body is significant. Bodies do not seem to even be important 
unless the owner is transported into one that is not their own. He is aware that he is not in 
the same body that he once inhabited and is able to make the distinction between “it” and 
“he.” 
Other bodies he inhabits are “a simulation of a creature, an organism designed to 
be at home in the pressure ice of a water world… He was not what he appeared to be,” 
this is where “he was beginning to wonder if he ever had been” (Banks, 246). In this case, 
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Vatueil seems perfectly aware that he is in a simulation, but it is here that he makes a 
poignant observation: 
The ice inside the water planet did not really exist; neither did the water planet 
itself, nor the star or orbited nor the galaxy beyond nor anything of what appeared 
to be real no matter how far out you might think you were looking. Nor how far in 
you looked, either. Peer into anything closely enough and you would find the 
same graininess that the Real exhibited; the smallest units of measurement were 
the same in both realms, whether it was of time or extent or mass (Banks, 246).  
Everything, virtual and real, is created of the same building blocks, reinforcing Graham’s 
observation that  “Truth and reality are indistinguishable from illusion or simulation” 
(Graham, 191). Whether it is created out of code or out of actual flesh and bone, the 
molecular structure is still there. They may not be the same sorts of molecules, but they 
are there. In a VR you may experience an entire lifetime in the span of ten minutes, but 
time still feels as though it is passing a minute or an hour at a time.  For instance, when 
trying to instill hope into Chay again, she one day wakes in the Refuge. In spite of 
nightmares, and her insistent atheism, Chay becomes one of the priestesses in the Refuge, 
working to copy manuscripts and sing hymns daily, for an entire lifetime until she grows 
old, becomes the Mother-Superior and eventually dies, only to be cast back into hell.  
Once she returns, she is changed, but it seems that no time has actually passed at all. She 
has subjectively experienced an entire lifetime or peace and contemplation, but once 
returned is more or less the same as before she woke in the Refuge. However, any time 
the setting is in the Real, the reader is never this aware of the physicality of a character.  
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Since Vatueil is a soldier in the ongoing war, the spaces he occupies are 
necessarily battlefields. In his article, “Surgical Strikes and Prosthetic Warriors: The 
Soldier’s Body in Contemporary Science Fiction,” Steffen Hantke points out that “The 
battlefield (which we might assume these places are) tends to become a metaphor for a 
state of mind more than a distinct geographical or topographical designation” (496). 
When war becomes a focus point of Surface Detail, we are given virtual battle grounds in 
varying degrees of realistic probability. These places become metaphors for the collective 
thought processes of the war, or what the participants believe the war should be. They are 
not Vatueil’s thought-processes, but those thought up by either side as a whole. The 
castle under siege, or the far reaches of space, or the terrifying non-spaces of hot-ice are 
direct representations of the state of war rather than actual geographical locations. While 
there might be a molecular structure to the battlefields, it still is not accessible to those 
walking the material plane. Hantke further expunges, “Since technology can literally 
move the battlefield anywhere, without consideration of the specific conditions of 
territory, war is now a possibility wherever we happen to find ourselves on the map” 
(497). Between the fictional speculation of Vatueil, and the real speculations of Hantke 
(appropriately) we can say that the boundaries between real and virtual are completely 
collapsed in this narrative. True, in order to achieve a virtual heaven, physical body or 
brain death must first occur. However, because of the technology, one cannot truly die 
unless they are permanently deleted. Somehow, with their consciousness still existing in 
the realm or molecular reality, like ghosts, they cannot move on, or at least that’s the 
theory. No one seems troubled by the idea that when body or brain death does occur, the 
person might die anyway and “move on” unto the next realm, leaving only a copy behind. 
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What, then, dies once the veritable ghost in the machine decides it doesn’t want to exist 
anymore? Are there multiples of the same soul in the afterlife? We are never given the 
answers to these questions, death remains the ultimate unknown horizon.  
Death creates something other than human, it creates a corpse that used to be 
human— the parts that make a living human alive are nowhere to be found. Ultimately, 
death cannot be known by the living, even virtual heavens and hells are not accessible to 
those who haven’t chosen to die yet. War dehumanizes those who participate in it, even 
through history the lives lost appear as numbers on the pages of textbooks. Surface Detail 
dehumanizes the participants even further, placing them in strange bodies for strange 
missions for purposes that we never know. Both death and war occupy virtual spaces, 
thus relegating that which is no longer seen as human—the other—the virtual space. 
Though war is dehumanizing to the living, its aspects pale in comparison to the treatment 
of souls in the virtual hells. 
We never get a real look into the heavens, knowing only what we are told in the 
beginning of the novel. After the narrative takes pains to tell us that hells are rarely 
shared across civilizations, we are given a very detailed look at one of them when a pair 
of concerned citizens hack into it in order to push their anti-hell movement along. The 
body, once again, plays an important role here, since much of the torture is physical. We 
find later that hell is a place of mental torment as well. The prospect of escape is dangled 
over those trapped. Ten may be taken to the gate, but only nine will be allowed to leave. 
Tours threatening those who are on the track to experience hell are floated over the 
landscape.  Chay, the Pavulean that is left behind becomes an angel, allowed to offer 
deliverance to one person a day only. Hell, it seems, does not work without hope.  A 
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body needs to believe that they will someday get out of hell in order for hell to be 
effective. Every day a soul suffers is, in theory, one day closer to their release. A soul 
such as Chay cannot be affected by the various tortures that the Pavulean Hell has to offer 
because she has resigned herself to this existence. Torturing her is no longer “fun” for the 
greater demons involved because she has no expectation of ever escaping. 
The one hell see is “In Valley 308, which was part of the Thrice Flayed Footprint 
district of the Pavulean Hell,” which just seems to be a location, but we learn: 
The once very important person to whom the flayed hand belonged was still, in 
some sense, alive, and suffered every moment from having had their skin 
removed. They suffered in a magnified sense, too, concomitant with their pelt 
having been so grotesquely scale-exaggerated that a single ridge on one of their 
feet—or paws, there being some fairly irrelevant disagreement concerning the 
correct terminology—was now vast enough to form part of the landscape on 
which so many others lived their post-death lives and suffering the multitudinous 
torments which had been prescribed them (Banks, 45-6). 
Not only is this hell a plane of blood-letting, rape, limb-breaking, nerve-flaying torture, 
but it is so creative as to have one of its inhabitants act as the landscape on which it all 
occurs. While it might be possible to look down at any once piece of scenery and identify 
one of the suffering beings there as having once been a person, it is less possible to do so 
when that person is literally the scenery. This hell occupies a warped animistic 
perspective. Normally, personalities are not attributed to the scenery. However, 
everything that exists in this vision of hell is alive and, in some sense of the word, a 
spirit. In general, animistic spirits have agency over their interactions with their human 
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counterparts, mostly these beings are harmless, those in hell have no agency. The souls 
trapped in hell are subjected to unique forms of torture, no one prays to them or asks for 
favors from them. When they are not being tortured, citizens of hell are expected to fight 
for their arbitrarily chosen side. We are never told what happens to them if they do not, it 
is easy to assume that their torment grows even worse. So not only are those who are 
trapped in hell subject to the dehumanizing process of bodily torture, they are subject to 
the dehumanizing process of a pointless war. They become tormented soldiers, slaves to 
the greater demons, all while existing as a string of code in an unknown server room in 
the deepest reaches of space.  
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IV. Chapter Three: The Oversaturation of Existence 
“Weren’t we supposed to be getting deep-bio upgrades by the time I hit fifty? Why is the 
future always… in the future?” –Hamish Brookeman, Existence 
Representations of the Post/Human refers to a published collection about what the 
future might look like. Graham notes, “There is nothing about the future of work, travel, 
or communication, and very little… concerned with curative medical applications outside 
of genetic therapies” (Graham, 156). Few of those who would consider reading such a 
magazine would care for anything but what lives of luxury might look like. Many science 
fiction novels, movies, and TV shows show us a future where robots do all of the heavy 
lifting and humans do not need to worry about where their food or fuel is coming from. 
Anything can be cured with the press of a button or the wave of a wand with a barely 
believable pseudo-scientific explanation. It is easy to see this post-scarcity trend 
continued in the works of Karl Schroeder or Iain M. Banks. 
David Brin, however, is known for writing “hard” science fiction or science 
fiction which rings with a hint of “this could actually happen.” His novel, Existence, acts 
as an example of what humanity could become in the next one hundred or so years, 
including a look at the lives of the impoverished and downtrodden in a world that cares 
about them even less than it did before. What the novel depicts is a fledgling future 
society on its way to the grander, more comfortable worlds of Lady of Mazes or even 
Surface Detail. Earth is on the cusp of possibly colonizing nearby planetary bodies while 
still being stuck in a rigid class system on an almost familiar global stage: the wealthy are 
at the top, making all of the choices and everyone else is trying to figure out how to make 
their way. It is a look at what we might become, and how we might react if First Contact 
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comes in the form of a piece of alien equipment rather than an actual organic being. The 
answers are troubling and include everything from quiet, aristocratic espionage to 
kidnappings and riots, to vague overall confusion. 
Though Existence is largely a story about First Contact with alien life, virtual 
reality has a major and often surprising role within its narrative. Virtual Reality plays a 
huge part in the lives of humans. The internet has gone from being colloquially called the 
“web” into being referred to as “the mesh,” and rather than using touch screen smart 
phones to access it, the people of the not-so-distant future use smart glasses and contact 
lenses. Artificial Intelligence and Virtual Reality are almost inseparable from one another 
in this narrative. The “smart” objects that humans wear not only allow the world to be 
seen in captions and pleasing overlays, they also read visual and subvocal cues to 
anticipate what their users want and do their best to deliver. However, with the neo-
aristocracy at the top of the social pecking order, access to technology is limited by one’s 
means to afford it.  It seems to be expected that everyone has access to something, or that 
is at least the illusion. We get a good look at Earth through the eyes of characters from 
several class-based walks of life, from the impoverished scavenger, Peng Xiang Bin to 
the famously infamous (and possibly autobiographical) author Hamish Brookeman, to the 
up-and-coming journalist Tor Povlov to the wealthy aristocrat Lacey Donaldson-Sander 
and her son Hacker. We even get the viewpoints of alien machines and hyper-intelligent 
dolphins. The narrative spans not only their personal struggles with the news of First 
Contact, but the overall struggles of the mobs of humanity (or whatever species) that 
surround them.  
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It is, if nothing else, an exceptionally fascinating look into what may or may not lie ahead 
for humanity.  
Existence offers a further look into the paradox of VR; alienating and uniting at 
the same time. Yet there is something intrinsically hopeful about the novel. It seems to 
want to convince us that in light of the imminent failure of a thousand other alien species 
to survive long past their space-faring years, humanity has a chance to beat the odds of 
total annihilation. Humanity will have to evolve into something closer to The Culture in 
order for it to beat those odds, but the novel seems hopeful. However, in direct opposition 
to other VR-heavy narratives, the othering that occurs is not necessarily one of a 
complete loss of humanity, but an oversaturation of it. Where others may focus on the 
dehumanizing aspects of othering, very rarely is that fact that too much of anything is just 
as problematic as too little of it. 
From Vanity to Virtual 
New technology is often fetishized. Advertisements show us shiny, glamourous 
new devices being wielded by shiny, glamorous people leading shiny, glamorous lives. 
Existence has taken what Graham calls “the intimacy of connection, [and] the 
consummation of desire, and computers [being] erotically charged” (Graham, 171) a step 
further straight into narcissism. As fledgling reporter Tor Povlov walks through a 
marketplace with her smart glasses catching the technology-enhanced advertisements and 
the products they advertise, her thoughts veer to herself: 
Tor couldn’t help doing a quick self-checkout, murmuring, “tsoosu.” 
Subvocal sensors in her collar translated—To See Ourselves as Others See Us—
and the inner surface of her specs lit with glimpse views of her, from several 
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angles, crowding the periphery of her percept, without blocking the center view 
Tor needed to walk safely. 
One image—from a pennycamera someone stuck high on a lamppost—
looked down at a leggy brunette walking by, her long dark hair streaked with 
tendrils of ever-changing color… 
Another tsoosu-vista showed her from ground level, smiling now as she 
passed a kiosk…It started with Tor’s oval face, lingered briefly over her white 
smile, then caressed downward, appreciated every curve, even as she strolled 
away (13). 
It is a testament to the vanity of the time that such a function even exists. There is a 
morbid curiosity following us to wonder what the world looks like from another’s point 
of view. The ability to see through someone else’s eyes might make us more humane if 
not necessarily more human. At the same time, Tor knows people like what they see 
when they watch her walk by, she takes pride in her relatively unaugmented appearance 
drawing gazes even in a time when beauty is cheaply acquired.  
It is worth noting here, if nowhere else, a further insight from Elaine Graham: 
It is argued that contemporary digital technologies, such as virtual reality, are 
merely a continuation of human capacity for tool-making. What may seem 
unfamiliar and threatening is but an extension of perennial skills, serving not to 
undermine or expunge the human, but to enhance it, as tools have always done 
(185). 
The logic is sound, human development is based upon what tools were created and used 
at any given time period, from fire to the wheel to the use of iron. There is no real reason 
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to believe that virtual reality is anything but a tool, whether it is used to spread and 
receive knowledge or to pursue one’s passions. It offers a freer and easier way of doing 
everything. Graham also mentions ways to “afford access into a group mind never before 
experienced” (170). Combine both of these sentiments and you get something similar to 
what Existence terms a “smart mob.” 
We are first introduced to the concept when Tor is following a lead to put an end 
to a terrorist attack in progress. After sifting through enough rumors to try to eke out the 
truth, she calls on the power of public knowledge to aid her, “I request a smart-mob 
coalescence. Feedme!” (Brin, 161) she demands. Hundreds respond, converging into a 
collective intelligence that works on majority consensus. There is the condition that there 
might be nothing of note happening aboard the zeppelin at all. There is enough interest 
generated that voices gather and guide her through the process of investigating something 
that may or may not be going horribly, explosively wrong in Tor’s immediate vicinity. 
Of course, Tor’s place on the zeppelin does prove to be useful from a journalistic 
standpoint, as she is right there when everything goes up in flames. She barely survives 
and ends up as a charred husk, but continues chasing leads and stories through the 
mesh—or the web hyperevolved for the future. With the help of her smart-mob, now 
comprised of fans and experts alike, she is instrumental in uncovering the secrets and 
conspiracies surrounding the alien artifact that is central to the narrative. The smart-mob 
is, perhaps, the most unique use of virtual reality that I will discuss. 
We learn, after Tor’s brave decision to do so that “Calling up a smart-mob was 
tricky.” It is especially tricky in a situation such as the one she is in, because “People 
might already be too scattered and distracted by the rumor storm. The number to respond 
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might not reach critical mass—in which case all you’d get is a smattering of critics, 
kibitzers, and loudmouths, doing more harm than good” (Brin, 162). In other words, a 
smart-mob might have practical uses on occasion if enough of the right people are around 
to join it. A dearth of people means that it could also go fantastically wrong. There is a 
trick to it; with the use of credibility, “you needed to attract a core group—the seed cell—
of online know-it-alls…armed with the latest coalescence software, who were smart and 
savvy enough to serve as prefrontals… coordinating a smart mob without dominating” 
(Brin, 162). Basically, there needs to be a core group of people passionate about the 
subject you need a smart-mob for, in this case navigating a zeppelin (and later 
discovering secrets and possible alien reasoning), who are also not egotistical enough to 
need to overpower the expertise of a group consciousness with vapid individualism. 
The collective consciousness is not an unfamiliar concept in science fiction 
novels, especially not those where alien-life is concerned. It is strange that collective 
consciousness is considered alien, since James O’Sullivan points out “The idea of 
collective consciousness… was adapted from real-world biological and sociological 
theory” (O’Sullivan, 80). Also termed ‘superorganism,’ or ‘hive mind1,’ Earthbound 
examples include ants, bees, some types of bacteria, and even a few animals. Less 
common is its association with human minds, though at its most broad definition, 
superorganism can also apply to entire ecosystems or human societies. A human society 
is usually not considered terribly alien as long as the human in question is living in it. 
                                                     
1 There is a small difference between a hive mind and a collective intelligence or consciousness. Hive 
minds often act on the impulses of one queen organism while collective intelligences/consciousnesses rely 
on the various intelligent contributions of all of its members.  
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However, a superorganism becomes strange once it gets narrowed down into a smaller 
cluster of human minds speaking with one voice. 
In fact, in novels such as Ender’s Game or Starship Troopers it is used as a device 
to show how alien the aliens are. They think and act in an entirely different manner than 
ourselves, the individual does not exist on the same scale, rather an individual is 
comprised of many minds. That, in itself, is telling when the usage is applied to human 
minds. A collective of individuals comes together and coalesces to create something new, 
something other that acts as a new form of consciousness: one meant to inform and to 
research with more credibility and accuracy than a single mind could accomplish… so 
long as the right sort of minds are at the core of it. 
Existence, along with those that O’Sullivan cites in his article, “Collective 
Consciousness in Science Fiction,” share the sentiment that in a collective intelligence 
situation, “Establishing and maintaining any form of individualism is largely 
incompatible with the idea of a collective consciousness” (82). Indeed, once people begin 
to lose interest in Tor’s mission to find out what’s going on in her zeppelin, they leave 
and she remarks that the mob , “was starting to sound individualized and had even used 
the first person ‘I’” (Brin, 169).  A smart mob, once created, gains a voice of its own. 
When it is large enough it refers to itself as “we,” but acts as a singular being. It is a 
difficult concept to wrap one’s head around, but it is inevitably categorized as becoming 
the other. Even if smart mobs do not seem to be something alien to anyone in the 
narrative, the smart-mob is not human as such. It is made of humans, but the same could 
be said of a society, or a particularly grotesque leather coat. “Made up of humans” does 
not mean human, and while we are struggling to figure out just what human actually 
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means, we somehow know that a collection of minds and voices forming one to make 
choices simply is not it. 
The trend of leaping outside of one’s self to become part of a greater whole 
follows Tor after she is nearly killed in a zeppelin explosion. Her brain is miraculously 
rebuilt, but she is confined to a container built for what remains of her flesh. After a 
period of self-pity as the scientists do their work to replace the neural connections her 
body lost in the explosion, Tor is able once again to resume her place as a truth-seeking 
journalist. In similar fashion to both Lady of Mazes and Surface Detail, with the benefit 
of once again being able to subvocalize, she is able to navigate the mesh with her now 
constant smart-mob. In much the same way that the sentient beings in Surface Detail 
must suffer brain death to access the heavens and hells, should they choose to do so, Tor 
must suffer a of physical near-death to exist almost purely in the realm of data. However, 
Tor must still be alive, science has advanced far enough that it can use experimental 
technologies to rebuild a brain, “soul savers” are not available to save Tor’s intelligence 
on a hard drive in a distant server room. “That notion has always been 99 percent fiction 
and 1 percent science…” Tor explains in one of her first written pieces as a cyborg (Brin, 
224).Tor, though living, though the darling of the mesh because of her heroics, is 
ultimately a science experiment in corporeal reality and a ghost on the mesh. 
With such unique fame comes the burden of fans posing questions to the famous. 
Tor answers some of them in her writing: 
Some of you have asked about organ reconstruction. Skin grafts are an 
ongoing bone of contention between me and the docs—they hurt like hell. 
But with biojet printers to spray my very own restemmed cells onto 
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layered scaffolds, all the simple, fibrous, and vasculated tissue can be 
grown—liver, spleen, and left lung—just like the vat-farmer raised that 
beetfish burger you had for lunch. 
Vat-grown organs call strange pictures of mice with human ears growing on their backs 
to mind. Generally, the ears are not functional and are for aesthetic purposes. Tor’s new 
parts are required to make a body function as a body. They are being bred as if they were 
genetically modified food fish. These, Tor needs to continue on as she is—riding the 
data-waves of the mesh to find a story. She does not look like a human body, though. She 
continues: 
There’s even talk of arm and leg transplants, if a reclam donor with 
my rare antigen type can be found. But I sense doubtful tones under their 
hopeful words, what with all the nerve damage I suffered. For certain I’ll 
never again have real eyes and ears. (It’s a wonder my skull protected 
what it did). 
So what’s the point? Shall I regain mobility by want-controlling a 
robotic walker? One of those hissing, clanking things? (Brin, 224). 
Margrit Shildrick writes about the issue of ownership with regard to prosthetics in 
her article, “Re-Imagining Embodiment: Prostheses, Supplements and Boundaries.” She 
remarks that those who are recipients of transplants and prosthetics are constantly asking 
“to whom does this body part belong” (273)? Tor knows where her replacement organs 
come from, but she is not bothered by them because without them, she would be dead. 
She draws the line at aesthetically pleasing, but medically unnecessary limbs (similar to 
the aforementioned mouse-grown ears). Tor makes the decision to favor function over 
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form, discarding her previous narcissism to embrace her new life as the inhuman other. 
She turns to the desire to spend her life as a working, sustainable brain to continue doing 
what she loves. 
It’s all in the HardwAIre 
As is clearly evidenced by Tor’s misadventure leading into her heroism, virtual 
reality does not exist without things. In Surface Detail and Lady of Mazes, the technology 
is directly implanted into the user’s brain. In Existence the hardware to access the internet 
(the mesh, as it is called in the novel) is still largely external. There are a few examples of 
persons with augmented eyes or brains, but they are far from the norm in the novel’s 
timeline. For the moment they are limited to using smart glasses, goggles and, contact 
lenses. The lenses, in whichever form, are capable of creating overlays on the world and 
as tracking visual interest and brainwaves. In other words, a person must interact with an 
object, something inorganic and outside of itself, to access a world that is both outside of 
and on top of the corporeal world. 
In Existence most of the virtual reality is backed by pseudo-AI. While not as 
sentient as they might be in an Asimov novel gone wrong, AIs are intelligent enough to 
interact with and sometimes even anticipate their users’ needs and wants, going to far as 
to “tap… laryngeal nerves and transcribe” anything an author or reporter says or thinks 
(Brin, 30). Gone is the age of having excellent ideas just before going to sleep, just have 
your “digaissistant” keep track of everything for you to sift through later. Having your 
subconscious and subvocal commands tracked isn’t the only thing they can do. “Music!” 
you can command, “Theme based on something by Elfman. Free-improve modulo, 
matching tempo to ambient sonic rhythms”(Brin, 79). If a person feels that they need a 
48 
 
soundtrack for their life, they can command any number of famous composers or artists 
and the music will match surrounding sonic vibrations, offering an appropriate backdrop 
to something as simple as doing your homework.  
Access to these technologies is, naturally, based on personal wealth and power. 
Earth has not reached the Lady of Mazes stage of indolence and free-for-all technology to 
keep the masses happy. One must still purchase the latest toy in order to keep up with the 
ever-changing trends with the continually updating technology and newer and newer 
virtual realities. The question that should come with the barrage of new technology is 
“Who is all of this for?” The answer is unsurprising, there is a clear emphasis on the 
luxuries of the future without any real focus on how much work has to be done or who is 
doing all of it. The wealthy bask in the freshly unwrapped plastic glow of new technology 
while everyone else struggles to keep up or shuns it altogether. Both sides are explored in 
Brin’s novel. 
There is an aristocracy, a small elite group controlling all of the money and power 
in the world. Many of them seem benevolent, donating vast sums of money to passion 
projects involving the arts or sciences. It is implied more than once that the very top of 
the pyramid has access to technology that the rest of the world doesn’t even know is 
possible. The hierarchy is clear, and it is evident that those at the top hold the firm belief 
that they should remain at the top. Lacey Donaldson-Sander, a member of this elite group 
muses, “Somebody had to guide the new era, so why not those who were raised and bred 
for leadership?” (Brin, 58) and later, she reasons “the species and planet would be better 
off guided by a single aristocracy, than by a fractious horde of ten billion short-tempered, 
easily-frightened “citizens” armed with nuclear and biological weapons”(Brin, 149). 
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These read like desperate rationalizations, especially after reporters like Tor think “how 
out of touch you are,” when interviewees remark, “Are you really that suspicious of the 
aristocracy?...how old fashioned” (Brin, 61) once they are faced with suspicion that the 
upper echelons will seek to monopolize any new tech or procedure that becomes 
available. 
Since Brin’s neo-aristocracy controls access to technology, there must be 
someone to distribute all of it to. The tiers fall to celebrities like the author, Hamish 
Brookeman, down to the already mentioned Tor Povlov who is firmly in the middle class. 
Both Tor and Brookeman have no trouble accessing the tech that they need for their lives 
and livelihoods. On this pre-cyberpunk earth, there is an entire class of people who are 
unable to participate in the highly technological future. Brin covers the desperately 
impoverished with Peng Xiang Bin, the Chinese scavenger having only a, “Cheap and 
obsolete” tablet that was “originally mass produced for poor children” that Bin’s wife, 
Mei Ling, stole when she left her previous job. However, because of how outdated and 
worthless it is, “it was never even reported stolen” (Brin, 91). Even when voicing the 
hopeful fact that the government would have to provide a better tablet device once their 
child becomes old enough for school, “Xiang Bin felt less sure. Grand promises seemed 
made for the poor to remember, while the mighty forgot” (Brin, 91). Bin’ hopeless 
musings recall the failure of the wealthy to keep any promises they make. None of the 
unanswered promises are ever addressed in the narrative, but Bin’s memory suggests that 
reneging on promises has happened before. It does not seem to matter, Bin and his family 
are members of a forgotten class: three in the millions just like them just trying to survive 
while the rest of the world is light years ahead. 
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Bin chose to leave the life of tending to “little-emperors” in a nursing home in 
order to try to build a better life for himself, his wife, and his infant son. As a result, he is 
out of touch with the rest of the world. When breaking news hits that an alien artifact has 
been discovered he only knows that a vague something has happened, “when the 
surrounding crowd seemed to halt, abruptly, all around him,” and realizes these were 
people who had been linked-in with goggles, specs, tru-vus, or contact-zhones” (Brin, 
93).  Certainly, the news does not affect him as much as it would other people who have 
the time and the technology to be affected by alien artifacts. He has more important 
things to worry about, such as holding on to his small piece of property. 
Everything and everyone including those with no access can have a caption, an 
advertisement, a witty comment, a note to someone who may never see it, or anything at 
all attached to them in various levels of VR. It is overwhelming to someone who has 
never before experienced it as it is to Bin’s wife, Mei Ling once she is able to buy a pair 
of specs because “so much of the world lay beyond sight of normal eyes” (Brin,226). Mei 
Ling finds herself having to (re)learn how to use the specs, exploring each level to see 
what exists on it. She discovers a layer where anyone can eavesdrop “if people don’t care 
enough to set up a privacy block,” and another layer where buildings become transparent 
(Brin, 228). Comments and advertisements can even eat upon themselves, 
“TOMORROW WELCOMES THE BOLD!” one such advertisement exclaims, “To 
which, a tagger had attached, in lurid vraiffiti, visible to anyone wearing specs—‘And 
Next Tuesday Greets the Gullible!” (Brin, 97, bold mine). One can paint the world to 
look like a jungle or a fantasy landscape of castles and fairies. One can become lost in the 
augmented reality of their virtual overlay with their AI assistants whispering in their ears. 
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However, unless you have the tools that allow a virtual overlay to be seen, you are stuck 
in the “gritty layer called reality” with the Bin family (Brin, 92). 
Those, then, who are the most organic—or at least possessing the least 
technology, end up being completely ignored by those of the species who are turning to 
machines, and ultimately travelling on the path to become them. Even Bin, who is not a 
member of this hyper-technologized future, ultimately falls to technology. On a 
scavenging trip, he manages to find an egg-shaped object that turns out to be a second 
alien artifact. Because of inquiries he begins to make about selling his object, a secretive 
organization gives him an ultimatum: come with us or you and your family die. Taking 
the obvious route to keep his life, he is given compensation and outfitted with a new eye 
(or aiye). The new eye is one of the only physical augmentations we see in the novel. 
Much like his wife, Bin must learn to use his new technology. While it is implied that 
Mei Ling has used a pair of specs before, Bin has never had his eye replaced. Where one 
eye is still a normal, organic, meat-person eye, the other is a robot eye designed to adjust 
brightness and contrast and do many of the same things that specs or the new contact 
lenses are able to do in a fraction of the time. 
The lesson is that all you have to do to participate in the rapidly growing 
technological future is find something unarguably remarkable and be targeted by 
potentially malicious para-government organizations. It is easy, anyone can do it, right? 
After Bin’s misadventure the impoverished disappear from the story, showing only Bin 
and his wife’s struggles to remain among the living during the First Contact event while 
there are people willing to go to great and bloody lengths to get their hands on Bin and 
his artifact. They have achieved the status of “haves,” leaving fellow “have-nots” to 
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continue to have no idea what is happening on the global stage. No one cares what the 
poor are doing. 
Like Unto Gods 
The fact the overlay technology was thought up and implanted into a popular 
medium is a statement to the desperate desire to see our imaginations physically realized 
in material space. Imagination, since it is not a corporeal thing can be closely linked with 
the soul, which is all about a human that it not the physical body. At some point, they 
must combine to make a complete being. Jean-Luc Nancy claims that the connection 
happens “through the activity of ordinary life, and not through thought and imagination 
as isolated faculties” (Nancy, 138). The imagination cannot be connected to the body 
through imagination. The imagination cannot be connected to the body at all, it is “not a 
transubstantiation but a communication” (Nancy,141). Imagination does not replace or 
become the soul. The soul occurs via communication between the body and its actions 
rather than the body and its thoughts. Thought is a part of the soul, action creates it. The 
whole premise shifts when the imagination can be realized as easily as a thought: when 
everyday life becomes imagination and vice versa. The space that the body once occupied 
is now larger. So, too, is the space that the soul takes up. Man has almost become a god 
in his own world because of a more complete unification and communication of soul and 
body, resulting in the realization of thought and imagination into a nearly physical form. 
Brin shows us a stepping stool to overcome and throw off the chains of simple humanity 
and providing a route to immortality through the alien artifacts. 
The artifacts pose a fascinating problem. The first artifact is found in orbit around 
Earth. The astronaut, Gerald Livingstone, is out on a trash run and takes a risk in pulling 
53 
 
the new and mysterious object in so that it can be further studied. The scavenger Peng 
Xiang Bin finds the second one at the bottom of the ocean. As soon as these devices 
begin to make themselves understood, hundreds more that have been sent to Earth 
explode in a confusion of communication attempts. Once researchers figure out how to 
communicate with the beings that appear inside the devices, the first impression is that 
[the first device found by Livingstone] “it’s a goddamned chain letter!... Whenever a new 
race joins the community,” the device explains, “it selects one individual of its kind to be 
copied into each new probe” (Brin, 323). The alien beings within the egg-shaped artifacts 
are all downloaded personalities, and they offer to teach humanity the secret of creating 
its very own probe. There is a catch: no species that has ever made probes has survived 
for very long past their deployment. 
True, this is not the literal immortality of an eternal physical body. However, in 
similar fashion to what the afterlives of Surface Detail offer, a consciousness can be 
copied and installed into a device and rocketed through the far reaches of space in the 
hopes of finding another sapient race to convert. They are full, artificial intelligence 
copies of real personalities just like the afterlives of The Culture. Thomas Frentz posits, 
“If disembodied intelligence, pure brain with no body, anticipates the next evolutionary 
advance in human history, then artificial intelligence may well be the clearest form of this 
trajectory, the pathway humans must take on their way to disembodiment” (Frentz 61). 
The next evolutionary phase may well be the loss of body. Whether we transform into 
streams of data or into disembodied beings of soul and energy is irrelevant. What 
humanity has done in this narrative is forced the evolution. They, with the help of other 
species, have learned how to exist as fully realized consciousnesses without needing to 
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have a physical body breathing and pumping blood for them elsewhere. Not only can a 
technically real person with thoughts and emotions and desires exist without a physical 
body, they can exist as a thousand different copies of themselves simultaneously. 
Ultimately, humanity finds that the artifacts are not chain letters at all. Rather, the 
are viruses with the ultimate goal is the total annihilation of a given species. Humanity is 
much more clever than to fall for it, though. While they do end up using the technology 
to achieve immortality (so to speak), they do not “sneeze” them into space to infect other 
species. Rather, they create telescopes to orbit the edges of the solar system and keep 
watch, and warn, and begin a new universal age of prosperity. Not only have humans 
physically become more than themselves physically, they have managed to pull together 
and do something truly remarkable together. It is an evolution of both physical and 
mental proportions, and we can only hope that if such a situation were to actually occur 
that we here on Earth would do something similar. 
 
Many of the things in the highly technological societies of science fiction many 
never come to pass—some might not even be realistically possible. As a contemporary 
device, VR is already beginning evolve into something similar to the world of Existence. 
Objects such as Google Glass and the Oculus Rift are on the horizon to offer humanity 
something resembling the vast virtual landscapes of Lady of Mazes and Surface Detail. 
These tales that started out as fun and imagination may slowly be coming to pass. 
However, like the fairy tales of older times, these narratives come with blazing 
warning signs attached to them, “Beware,” they say, “Your humanity is at risk.” That 
isn’t to say that virtual reality should be shunned and thrown away. Cyberspaces offer us 
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as a species easier and better ways to globally communicate and to share our ideas with 
others who may have different points of view or ways of thinking.   
These three novels show the alienating effects that being handed whatever you 
want can have on a species. When there is nothing to strive for or fight against, people 
seem to stop talking to each other and elect to lose themselves flying over the rings of 
Saturn or choosing death over the continued lack of conflict that post-scarcity life 
implies.  
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